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	<title>Comments on: What is OpenID and why hasn&#8217;t it been setup correctly?</title>
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	<link>http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/03/27/what-is-openid-and-why-hasnt-it-been-setup-correctly/</link>
	<description>Javascript blog with messed up syntax inside</description>
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		<title>By: Gareth Heyes</title>
		<link>http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/03/27/what-is-openid-and-why-hasnt-it-been-setup-correctly/#comment-141</link>
		<dc:creator>Gareth Heyes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 2007 09:03:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>To help you understand the problem I suggest you look into CSRF attacks [1]. The major problem is that an attacker could create a page that could automatically execute actions on your behalf. 

Now some providers have provided protection against this and others haven&#039;t, even the ones that have provided protection it could still be possible to perform the attack. I suggest any providers reading this also read my other blog posting on how to prevent these sort of attacks [2]

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery
[2] http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/04/12/one-time-form-tokens/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To help you understand the problem I suggest you look into CSRF attacks [1]. The major problem is that an attacker could create a page that could automatically execute actions on your behalf. </p>
<p>Now some providers have provided protection against this and others haven&#8217;t, even the ones that have provided protection it could still be possible to perform the attack. I suggest any providers reading this also read my other blog posting on how to prevent these sort of attacks [2]</p>
<p>[1] <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery</a><br />
[2] <a href="http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/04/12/one-time-form-tokens/" rel="nofollow">http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/04/12/one-time-form-tokens/</a></p>
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		<title>By: Gareth Heyes</title>
		<link>http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/03/27/what-is-openid-and-why-hasnt-it-been-setup-correctly/#comment-140</link>
		<dc:creator>Gareth Heyes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 2007 08:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Ah yes but what if there is a problem with how that works? What if it was possible to automatically add that site to your &quot;trusted&quot; sites even though you&#039;ve never visited it before.

I have already proved that once with MyOpenID and I have found other providers to have the same problems. The fact is if you don&#039;t confirm a password on a site request, your OpenID service is less secure then if you did.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ah yes but what if there is a problem with how that works? What if it was possible to automatically add that site to your &#8220;trusted&#8221; sites even though you&#8217;ve never visited it before.</p>
<p>I have already proved that once with MyOpenID and I have found other providers to have the same problems. The fact is if you don&#8217;t confirm a password on a site request, your OpenID service is less secure then if you did.</p>
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		<title>By: Snyke</title>
		<link>http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/03/27/what-is-openid-and-why-hasnt-it-been-setup-correctly/#comment-139</link>
		<dc:creator>Snyke</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Apr 2007 20:59:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The thing is that most OpenID Providers provide a mechanism for you to choose which sites to trust and what information to disclose to a site. When I log in using my MyOpenID account to a site I&#039;ve never visited before, I&#039;m asked if I want to log in to it, and if they have requested a Nickname or Email, if I want to give it to them. After the first log in, the provider remembers my decision and forwards me directly.
I can revoke my decision whenever I want to.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The thing is that most OpenID Providers provide a mechanism for you to choose which sites to trust and what information to disclose to a site. When I log in using my MyOpenID account to a site I&#8217;ve never visited before, I&#8217;m asked if I want to log in to it, and if they have requested a Nickname or Email, if I want to give it to them. After the first log in, the provider remembers my decision and forwards me directly.<br />
I can revoke my decision whenever I want to.</p>
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		<title>By: Gareth Heyes</title>
		<link>http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/03/27/what-is-openid-and-why-hasnt-it-been-setup-correctly/#comment-138</link>
		<dc:creator>Gareth Heyes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Apr 2007 08:25:43 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Well the point is that I think it would be possible for an attacker to force you to trust any site and also log onto any OpenID enabled web site. I don&#039;t see how my point could be any stronger or clearer.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well the point is that I think it would be possible for an attacker to force you to trust any site and also log onto any OpenID enabled web site. I don&#8217;t see how my point could be any stronger or clearer.</p>
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		<title>By: Snyke</title>
		<link>http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2007/03/27/what-is-openid-and-why-hasnt-it-been-setup-correctly/#comment-137</link>
		<dc:creator>Snyke</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2007 17:26:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I don&#039;t see your point, whether the password is remembered or not is up to the provider/user. Even better if the Server already recognizes me I won&#039;t be tricked into some phishing attacks (other sites emulating my OpenID provider), because the browser takes care of recognizing my Provider. The less I send my password over the net the better. And by the way the OpenID standard says that I have to prove to my Provider that it&#039;s actually me, and does not specify that this should be done using password, I could just as good use a public-private-key infrastructure.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t see your point, whether the password is remembered or not is up to the provider/user. Even better if the Server already recognizes me I won&#8217;t be tricked into some phishing attacks (other sites emulating my OpenID provider), because the browser takes care of recognizing my Provider. The less I send my password over the net the better. And by the way the OpenID standard says that I have to prove to my Provider that it&#8217;s actually me, and does not specify that this should be done using password, I could just as good use a public-private-key infrastructure.</p>
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